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Marxism and US foreign policy 
 
Introduction 
 
During the previous decade, with the terrorist attacks on 9/11 coupled with 
the increased militarization of US foreign policy and the invasions and 
occupations of both Afghanistan and Iraq, analysts and students of IR have 
increasingly sought to employ critical International Relations (IR) theories 
that can interrogate not just the dominant discourses and social 
constructions of the discipline, but also the political and economic aspects of 
the social world itself. At the same time, neo-liberal globalization increasingly 
exacerbated concentrations of global wealth, with the richest 2 per cent of 
the world’s people owning more than half of global household wealth. The 
bottom half of three billion people own barely 1 per cent. The UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization has shown that by the time you finish reading this 
sentence, a child will have died of hunger (a child dies every 5 seconds).1 
They conclude that twenty four billion dollars are needed to save five million 
children from starvation every year and yet the US-led war and occupation in 
Iraq has cost in excess of three trillion dollars, which is a ‘conservative’ 
estimate according to Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World 
Bank (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008, 2010).2 This alone gives a clear indication of 
social priorities. Moving from a global to a national scale, wealth and power is 
still deeply concentrated with U.S. households in the top 20 percent of the 
income distribution earning more than 80 percent of the nation's wealth.  
 
                                                 
1 United Nations, ‘Press Conference by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Right to Food. 26 October, 
2007. http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/071026_Ziegler.doc.htm 
2 In 2010, Stiglitz & Blimes further argued that this three trillion dollar price tag is likely to be an 
underestimation. Online. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/03/AR2010090302200.html 
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According to Marxist theorists, these concentrations of wealth and power are 
an inevitable result of capitalism, an economic system in which a minority 
own and control the means of production and the great majority are forced 
to sell their labour power in order to survive. The purpose of this chapter is 
not to provide a ‘Marxism 101’ introduction to Marxist theory per se. This has 
been done in numerous books. Rather, this chapter seeks to show how 
Marxism is being used to understand the role of the US within global politics 
and the international political economy. As the key capitalist power within the 
global economy, the American state has been crucial in underwriting and 
supporting the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production across the 
globe throughout the post-war period. This support has ranged from 
economic reforms that have sought to maintain an ‘open-door’ global 
economy conducive for global business interests to strategic interventions to 
overthrow governments that are or have been considered hostile to either 
capitalist social relations or US political hegemony within the post-war order. 
Today, America’s power and the way it is used has become a crucial concern 
of IR, with a ‘long war’ declared against nebulous enemies and potential 
hegemonic transition to China in a more multipolar world. This concern with 
the exercise of American power is best illustrated with the return of the 
concept of ‘American Empire’ across a broad range of theoretical and political 
sentiment.  
 
Crucially, the world that we have described above did not form itself, but was 
in fact created through human actions and choices, as well as wider 
structural processes of historical transformation. As students of IR and US 
foreign policy we must thus ask: how did we arrive at a point in human 
history whereby the richest people on the planet, who often in turn come 
from the richest families, earn more in an hour than the poorest people earn 
in a lifetime? What can Marxism tell us about current trends in world politics 
and, as the world’s dominant state, how can we analyze the role that US 
foreign policy has played in the construction and defense of global 
capitalism?  
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Imperialism  
 
Traditional Marxist approaches to US power are rooted within competing 
theories of imperialism. Imperialism itself can be defined as the policy 
process of extending a nation's authority through territorial acquisition (for 
example, the British Empire) or by the establishment of economic and 
political dominance over other nations and it can and often does take two 
forms. The first is a more formal type of imperialism that involves overt 
conquest, territorial control, direct military rule and so on. The second type is 
a more informal form of imperialism that often involves more indirect means 
of control through, for example, economic dominance through the imposition 
of ‘free trade’ regimes whereby trade arrangements are imposed on weaker 
countries by the imperial powers where they are strong (and thus 
guaranteeing economic preponderance) while ignoring these principles in 
areas where they are weak. A contemporary example would be the use of 
tariff barriers by rich nations to support domestic markets such as farming, 
while insisting on ‘free trade’ regimes for the poorer nations. In this way, 
surplus extraction occurs through a global market mechanism with no 
necessary need to use more formal types of imperialism such as military 
conquest.3 In both types of imperialism, then, the ends remain the same: the 
extraction of surplus value, profits and raw materials from subordinates 
regions, while the means may differ.  
 
Importantly, within the Marxist tradition, imperialism is intimately bound up 
with the historical internationalization of capitalism as a mode of production 
across the globe. That is, as capitalism as a mode of economic organization 
has historically extended beyond the rich and powerful nations, powerful 
states imposed their economic interests on other non-capitalist regions and 
thereby incorporated them within the capitalist global economy that they 
                                                 
3 For the classic article on this distinction see  Gallagher, J and Robinson, R (1953) ‘The Imperialism of 
Free Trade’ The Economic History Review, VI:1 http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gallagher.htm  
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effectively controlled. One only has to briefly examine the history of 
European colonialism to see uneven development and the legacy of this 
process, not least of which are continued post-imperial conflicts rooted in the 
arbitrary ‘stitching’ of cultures, tribes and faiths together.  
 
However, while there are agreements within Marxism about these common 
features of imperialism, there are quite strong divergences over the 
motivations for imperial expansion, what imperialism means for the 
international system in terms of war and peace and more importantly for this 
chapter, the role that the state and interstate relations play within 
contemporary forms of global imperialism. The two key differences are 
heavily rooted in the early Marxist debates between two contending theories 
of imperialism. The first is Lenin’s inter-imperial rivalry thesis (IIR) that 
posits the inevitability of rivalry and conflict within International Politics as a 
result of the expansion of rival imperialisms. The second is Kautsky’s Ultra-
imperialism thesis (UI) that posits the possibility of peaceful cooperation 
between imperial powers. We now outline these different theories and how 
they feed in to contemporary Marxist debates on US foreign policy.  
 
Lenin: Inter-Imperial Rivalry 
 
Turning to Lenin’s IIR thesis, he argued that the processes of political and 
military domination of the world by the great powers were a logical outcome 
of the steady internationalization of those same state’s economic interests. 
That is, as capitalism developed, those states that had the lead in this 
process, namely the European great powers, had also expanded their 
economic interests abroad to encompass other territories and countries. 
Given the tight integration between the state and business elites, it was 
logical that the military power of the state would be used to defend its 
economic interests as well.  
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For Lenin’s thesis, the most important part of this process was less the fact 
of overseas capitalist expansion, but what this meant for interstate relations 
between the capitalist powers. For Lenin, as these states (and their political 
alliances) expanded their imperial interests abroad, an inevitable rivalry 
would increase as they jockey for power and raw materials throughout the 
world.  
 
As Lenin makes clear, businesses and capital will naturally seek to expand 
beyond the home state’s borders as they grow larger and this process is 
driven by the fact that capital needs productive outlets in overseas markets 
and tends towards monopolisation (smaller firms get swallowed up by bigger 
firms) while national markets are not big enough to soak up the products 
produced. Overseas markets also provide new outlets for goods as well. 
However, as powerful nations carve up the globe in their economic and 
political interests, there is the ever present threat of interstate war as states’ 
interests collide. As such, according to the IIR theory, there is zero-sum logic 
to the internationalization of capitalism whereby processes of imperial 
expansion always threaten war as imperialist powers’ interests are 
threatened by other great powers jockeying for political and economic 
hegemony. In many ways, Lenin’s IIR thesis is similar to Realist analyses of 
IR, except that realists tend not to unpack how the ‘national interest’ is 
derived and of course in the Marxist case, rivalry is rooted within the 
expansive logic of capitalism, not the logic of anarchy.  
  
In applying the IIR thesis to present day US foreign policy, the thesis 
received a massive fillip with the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, with 
many commentators using the concept to understand the motivations of the 
US war drive in the Middle East. After all, here is a region that has long been 
subject to Western imperialism and possesses an abundance of one of the 
most important raw resources in the world: oil. 
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Foster captures this argument well when he argues that  ‘intercapitalist 
rivalry remains the hub of the imperialist wheel … In the present period of 
global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all to 
expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating 
the rest of the capitalist world to its interests’.4  By extension, contemporary 
US imperialism is seen as the result of the unified interest of the 
predominant sectors of US business, which need to ensure and manipulate 
export markets for both goods and capital. Accordingly, business interests 
are thus seen as essentially controlling the American state with military 
competition between competing powers an extension of international 
economic competition, which is in itself driven by the expansionist nature of 
capitalism.  
 
As we have seen above, then, inherent in the IIR thesis, as well as more 
recent analyses of American foreign policy is often an instrumentalist theory 
of the state. Simply stated, instrumentalist accounts argue that the state is a 
mere ‘instrument’ in hands of national elites. As Miliband, one of the chief 
proponents of state instrumentalism argued, ‘the ruling class of a capitalist 
society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and 
which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use 
the state as its instrument for the domination of society’ (Miliband 1969: 
13).5 This theorization of the American state (and by extension, US foreign 
policy) tends to reduce American decision making down to the economic 
interests of the American capitalist class, with the American state’s primary 
function one of ensuring the necessary conditions for profit maximization for 
US corporations throughout the globe. Inherent within this theory of the 
American state is an economic reductionism whereby the political and 
strategic logics of US statecraft are subordinated to the economic interests of 
American capital with the state the central organizational conduit of this 
process. The projection of American power is thus seen as little more than 
                                                 
4 Foster, J. (2003) ‘The New Age of Imperialism’, Monthly Review, 55:3, p.13.  
5 Miliband, R. (1969) The State in Capitalist Society, New York: Basic Books, p.23. 
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the extension of an iron fist for corporate interests (we will critique this 
position later in the chapter).   
 
 
Kautsky: Ultra-imperialism and the liberal post-war order 
 
Counter posed to Lenin’s stark portrait of interstate relations stands the ideas 
of Lenin’s contemporary Karl Kautsky who coined a rival theory of 
imperialism termed ‘ultra-imperialism’. Unlike Lenin, Kautsky posited the 
potentiality for the powerful capitalist nations to develop common-interests in 
exploiting the globe and for their respective capitalists to prefer collaboration 
and spheres of influence rather than the costly and often deeply destabilizing 
phenomenon of war. Rather than reading interstate relations and the 
internationalization of capitalism as a zero-sum game, Kautsky instead 
argued that businesses and states will instead prefer to fashion forms of co-
operation and coordination between themselves. That is, states can 
cooperate within a common framework and, crudely put, agree to carve up 
the globe between them. This form of coordination and collaboration can be 
seen in the operation of US foreign policy in the post-war period when the US 
emerged as the key hegemonic power within the global economy.  
 
How did the US emerge as the key power within the capitalist global 
economy? The US role as the lead state within world capitalism became 
increasingly clear with the decline of Britain, the custodian of global free 
trade prior to the end of the Second World War. US power in the post-War 
period was underwritten by its unrivalled military, political and economic 
power. At the end of the War, for example, the US had almost half of the 
world’s manufacturing capacity, the majority of its food supply and nearly all 
of its capital reserves. In this new role, post-war US foreign policy was 
formulated around a dual strategy: the maintenance and defence of an 
economically liberal international system conducive for business expansion 
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coupled with a global geo-strategy of containing social forces considered 
inimical to capitalist social relations.  
 
Importantly, in this endeavor the American state acted not just in its own 
interests but also in the interests of other core powers that relied upon the 
American state to contain the spread of world communism, rollback third 
world nationalism and to underwrite the institutions and enforce the rules of 
the liberal international order. This liberal order was concretized through the 
American dominated Bretton Woods institutions that helped fashion the post-
war order, the internationalization of American capital and business models 
(primarily through American foreign direct investment) and US dominance of 
the strategic frameworks of other core powers, for example NATO for Europe 
and the Japan-US Security pact.  
 
US hegemony was thus positive-sum, and the post-war order was a form of 
ultra-imperialism, in so far as US power benefited other core capitalist 
powers and provided a coordination mechanism where common interests 
were represented by the US state. Importantly, this positive-sum generic 
reproductive function for global capitalism has formed a key component of 
American power and has undergirded its hegemony in the post-war 
international system. In a sense, then, American power has played a system-
maintaining role that has benefited a number of core states as well as 
America itself, and US foreign policy in the post-war system has acted to 
expand and defend capitalism throughout the globe while attempting to 
(largely successfully) pacify geo-political rivalries between the great powers 
through providing sets of collective security and economic goods for the 
capitalist system as a whole. As such, we can describe the post-war order 
that the US was instrumental in creating as a form of ultra-imperialism.  
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US Cold War policy  
 
US foreign policy during the Cold War era thus sought a number of key 
objectives. First, it sought to build up and integrate a revitalized Western 
Europe and Japan-centered East Asia under its hegemony. Although this 
process benefited these regions, this was not a multilateral order as many 
liberal theorists claim, but was in fact what could be called a ‘conditional 
multilateralism’ insofar as multilateral forms of order were acceptable to US 
planners as long as it suited Washington’s interests. Importantly, US 
hegemony relied upon consent as well as force, and its forms of highly 
successful economic success based on innovative Fordist type 
industrialization methods provided attractive models for other capitalist 
states keen to recover from the devastation of the Second World War. In this 
way, the American state emerged as the key power within the capitalist 
global economy, a hegemony that it continues to enjoy today.  
 
Second, the American state sought to play a system maintaining role 
whereby US power was used to defend the liberal international order against 
threats from anti-systemic movements and it thus benefited other core 
capitalist states and allowed them to both prosper economically through the 
buildup of economic interdependence but also strategically as US power was 
used to both prevent Soviet expansion within Western Europe, but also to 
police the developing world. This policing function was driven by a desire to 
not only contain Soviet inspired insurgencies but also forms of independent 
nationalism that threatened crucial raw resources (for example, oil) or that 
posed symbolic threats to US global hegemony by challenging the US-led 
global system. To this end, the US sought to install and support authoritarian 
forms of rule as developing world democracies were often seen as potentially 
dangerous as there always existed the threat that these democracies may 
prove to be too responsive to majoritarian interests that invariably favored 
wealth redistribution given the often extreme concentrations of wealth found 
in the developing world. The anti-democratic nature of US policy in the 
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developing world ran throughout the Cold War period as the various US-
backed anti-democracy coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia 
(1965), Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1984) amply illustrate. In short, the ends 
were used to justify the means. 
 
The human cost of this support was enormous with all but two hundred 
thousand of the twenty million people that died in wars between 1945 and 
1990 dying in the Third World. Furthermore, US interventions during the Cold 
War were frequently justified with anti-communist rhetoric but they often 
extended far beyond real or imagined Soviet aligned communists to 
encompass a wide range of progressive social forces that sought social 
change in their often highly class stratified societies. In a profound sense, 
then, US foreign policy during the Cold War was often closely aligned with a 
wide range of reactionary and anti-progressive regimes that by the nature of 
the US’s global interests formed a containment mechanism for the prevention 
of social change in the developing world. 
 
Crucially, Marxist scholars seek to broaden the understanding of Cold War US 
foreign policy from a simple narrative of Soviet containment by also 
incorporating the economic interests of the US as a key capitalist power, as 
well as the strategic and political logics of US statecraft. US foreign policy is 
thus embedded within wider structures that are not exhausted by a realist 
logic of strategy or a liberal strategy of what we might call a ‘muted idealism’ 
during the Cold War.   
  
We now turn to develop the ways in which contemporary Marxist theorists 
have taken these theories of imperialism and applied them to US foreign 
policy after 9/11. In particular, we are interested in examining the work of 
the ‘Global Capitalist’ school.  
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Globalization and post-Cold War US foreign policy 
 
The concept of globalization has come to increased prominence, especially 
after the end of the Cold War when the capitalist world was freed from the 
constraints placed upon it by the existence of the Soviet Union. The global 
economy became truly integrated under western hegemony, with neo-liberal 
shock therapy applied throughout the third world and also the former Soviet 
Union, a hitherto tightly closed sector of the global economy. Capital literally 
‘went global’ and the barriers to the circulation of international finance were 
torn down with a wave of privatizations and neo-liberal reforms. Alongside 
the emergence of an increasingly globally integrated economy, there 
emerged a broad range of academic sociological and political works that 
analyzed these trends under globalization.  
 
In particular, there has emerged a key body of work known under the broad 
rubric of global capitalist approaches. These new approaches argued that 
accompanying the rise of an increasingly globally integrated economy, new 
global state and class structures were also forming. This new form of global 
empire increasingly bypassed or transformed state structures. Perhaps the 
best known of these approaches was the surprise best seller Empire by Hardt 
and Negri. However, the most cogent work within Marxism has been 
developed by William Robinson who examines transnational trends under 
globalization and the ways in which the transnationalization of capital is 
impacting upon forms of contemporary US foreign policy. For Robinson, the 
new global economy has allowed an increasingly transnationally based capital 
to reorganize production relations that supersede national economies and 
national states with national systems of production becoming fragmented 
and integrated into a new global configuration.  
 
Robinson contends that we are witnessing the increased transnationalization 
of the state as capital becomes increasingly transnationalized. 
Transnationally orientated states provide the national infrastructure that is 
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necessary for economic activity, adopt policies that assure internal economic 
stability and maintain social order through both coercive and consensual 
means. In short, transformed nation states adopt and implement neo-liberal 
reform which is the primary policy modality of capitalist globalization which in 
turn integrates them as circuits within the transnational circulation of capital. 
The Transnational state (TNS) thus encompasses both the transformed and 
transnationally orientated neo-liberal nation-states and supranational 
economic and political forums such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. While 
these forums do not, as yet, have any centralized institutional form 
reminiscent of a formal state, they nonetheless provide a coordinating 
mechanism necessary for global capital accumulation. Concomitant to the 
rise of this TNS is the emergence of a new global class: the Transnational 
Capitalist Class (TCC). This new global class is directly related to the changes 
in the global organization of production and the rise of a nascent TNS. 
Importantly, this reconfiguration of global class relations changes the 
dynamics of competition between nation-states with the potential for inter-
imperialist rivalry and war shifting from competing nation-states to new 
global oligarchies competing within a transnational environment (Robinson 
2004). 
 
Robinson’s portrait of contemporary globalization has very clear implications 
for the analysis of contemporary imperialism and US foreign policy, insofar as 
traditional analyses tend to foreground the nationally bounded nature of the 
imperial project (as we saw above). However, Robinson argues that to 
analyze the US as an imperialist power misses a crucial nuance in 
contemporary capitalist globalization. That is, rather than competing nation-
states, or even competing blocs (for example East Asian versus European 
capital), the age of transnational capital now means that there is a diffusion 
of capitalist interests so that one can no longer territorialize interests within a 
bounded nation-state. For example, investors from the US have billions of 
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dollars invested in Asia; economic dynamism in this region, thus argues 
Robinson, ‘benefits those investors as much as it benefits local elites’. 6  
 
He therefore rejects outright a theory of world order as characterized by the 
potential for inter-imperial rivalry between competing capitalist states.  
Importantly, this does not mean that leading capitalist states are no longer 
central to the maintenance of global capitalism, and Robinson contends that 
the US state continues to be the global hegemonic capitalist state. However, 
and this is the crucial point, for Robinson the US state now acts as the 
central agent of transnational capital, rather than a nationally grounded US 
ruling class, with US military preponderance acting not to secure American 
hegemony vis-à-vis potential geopolitical rivals, but for the interests of 
transnational capital as a whole. Robinson is unequivocal about this, and he 
argues that ‘US military conquest does not result in the creation of exclusive 
zones for the conquerors exploitation … but the colonization and 
recolonization of the vanquished for the new global capitalism and its agents 
… the US military apparatus is the ministry of war in the cabinet of an 
increasingly globally integrated ruling class’.7 
 
In relation to US intervention in oil rich regions, this transnational, positive-
sum organizational role played by the American state is most clear. Rather 
than interpreting US intervention in, for example, Iraq as a case of US 
imperialism using its military might to exclude oil corporations from 
competing nations (for example, France or Russia) it is far more accurate to 
view US intervention as part of the generic role that the US state has long 
performed in ‘stabilizing’ market-orientated political economies throughout 
the Middle East (ME) for the generic interests of global capitalism as a whole. 
That is, by underwriting transnationally-orientated political economies in the 
ME, the US has deliberately guaranteed security of oil supply to world 
                                                 
6 Robinson, R. (2004) A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational 
World, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, p.131. 
7 Robinson, R. (2004) A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational 
World, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, p.140. 
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markets. As such, US intervention in these regions (of which the Iraq 
invasion is a paradigmatic example) has benefited other core capitalist states 
as much as it has the US.  
 
The destination of oil from the Persian Gulf illustrates this point most clearly: 
although the US enjoys strategic primacy in the ME, it only draws ten percent 
of its total oil supplies from the region. The remainder is shipped primarily to 
Japan, Europe and increasingly China. IIR theorists that analyze the 
intervention in Iraq in stark terms thus presume that other capitalist states 
do not have an equally important interest in the US working to guarantee 
both regional political economies open to capital penetration and state 
structures able to discipline social forces (be they nationalist, Islamist or 
explicitly anti-capitalist) that may threaten the security of oil supplies to 
world markets. 
 
In sum, Robinson builds upon Kautsky’s argument by arguing that we have 
thus entered an era of decentred and deterritorialized transnational Empire 
that escapes the territorialized logic of earlier imperialisms and the 
geopolitical competition inherent within inter-imperial rivalry theories. 
Needless to say, his conclusions also have major ramifications for the 
analysis of US foreign policy and American intervention within the global 
economy. We now turn to consider some problems with the ‘global capitalist’ 
approach and its application to US foreign policy.    
 
The Dual Logic of US Foreign policy 
 
Along with other ‘global capitalist’ theorists, Robinson provides a much-
needed corrective to the overly statist and instrumentalist accounts of 
traditional historical materialist analyses of US empire. The more 
economically reductionist Marxism has always been weak on the 
development of the liberal order in the post-war system and on the role that 
geo-politics and strategy have played in US foreign policy (while realist and 
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liberal approaches to US foreign policy have in turn been weak on the 
political economy of US foreign policy or have ignored the often destructive 
and destabilizing role that Western economic intervention has played). 
 
However, while his work serves as a useful corrective to these approaches, 
we wish to argue that Robinson also fails to capture the full logic of 
contemporary US foreign policy, and in particular underplays the role that 
the US performs in securing interests for the US state as the lead actor 
within the globalised capitalist environment.  
 
When arguing that the US intervenes in order to pursue a transnational 
capitalist agenda on behalf of the TCC, Robinson fails to take full account of 
the overwhelming preponderance that territorialized US capital has within the 
global market system. This nationalized dominance of the global economy is 
most clearly seen in the geographical location of key members of the so-
called TCC. For example, in 2011 the US headquartered 133 of the world’s 
500 largest businesses. The second largest was Japan with 68, followed by 
China with 61.8 In the same year, the US was the largest recipient of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) with $227 billion of inward FDI. This figure is almost 
double the amount of inward FDI in China, which, with $124 billion, is the 
second highest recipient of FDI. In terms of FDI outflows, the US is also the 
largest source of FDI. In 2011, the US reached a record high of $397 billion 
of outward FDI, more than triple the amount when compared to Japan, the 
next highest with $114 billion.9 Of the world’s richest members of the so-
called TCC, the majority are American, with eleven of the world’s twenty 
richest people holding US citizenship, followed by two citizens with French 
citizenship. 
 
More significantly, the interests of American capital are secured throughout 
the structures and institutions of transnational capitalism, primarily by 
                                                 
8 Data available from CNN Money. Online. Available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/index.html 
9 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, p. 4, pp. 169-170. 
16 
 
ensuring that the preponderance of US market power can be exercised in the 
absence of any significant restraints. As just one example, US foreign policy 
has been instrumental in implementing neo-liberalism throughout Latin 
America, both through its multilateral agreements with states in the region, 
and its domination of the international institutions that are implementing 
neo-liberal reforms. The Free Trade of the Americas Act (FTAA) built upon 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) passed by the US 
Congress, Canada and Mexico in 1993. NAFTA sought to integrate the 
economies of North America, Canada and Mexico into a single trading bloc, to 
dismantle trade barriers, to privatize state-owned industries and to loosen 
the restrictions on the movement of capital. Like NAFTA, the FTAA seeks to 
link the economies of all the Latin American nations (with the exception of 
Cuba) into a single trade bloc. The FTAA is based on a corporate-led model of 
development that will accelerate post-Cold War neo-liberal reforms of 
national economies throughout Latin America, and at first glance can be 
viewed as a classic case of the US acting according to Robinson’s logic (i.e., 
to affect a transnational outcome beneficial to the TCC). 
 
However, the FTAA contains a number of provisions that have strengthened 
the power of specifically American capital, due to the removal of all barriers 
restraining the sheer preponderance of US market power within the 
transnational system (informal imperialism). 
 
At the time of its implementation in 2000, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
of North, Central and South America was $11,000 billion. However, the US’s 
share of this GDP was 75.7 percent, with Brazil, which was the next largest, 
at 6.7 percent, Canada's was 5.3 percent while Mexico's was 3.9 percent. 
The other thirty one nations comprised only 8.4 percent. Per capita GDP in 
the US was $30,600 in 2000 while the lowest, Haiti, stood with just $460.10 
The FTAA and other neo-liberal variants will serve to deepen the already 
overwhelming power of US capital by dismantling national trade barriers to 
                                                 
10 Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2001. 
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allow easier penetration by US capital and US-subsidized exports, the 
increase in the privatization (and consequent foreign ownership) of state 
owned industries, and the more rigorous enforcement of the intellectual 
property rights of (mainly) US corporations.11 What we have, then, is, 
subject to resistances, the US state acting to secure a transnational outcome 
which will benefit a number of capitals and the transnationally orientated 
elites of the respective nations. But due to both the US preponderance of 
market power and capital internationalization, this will primarily benefit US 
corporations and capitalists.  
 
This dynamic is brought home most clearly within another context: the US 
Congress’s ratification of the WTO treaty. The WTO is one of the key 
institutions of global economic governance and is seen by the global capitalist 
theorists as one of the principal institutional forms for the emergent TNS. 
However, Section 301 of the US’s trade act allows the US Congress to 
unilaterally reject WTO provisions that may threaten key US industries or 
economic interests. As Gowan has argued, the US has participated in 
international economic regimes when it suits its economic interests but US 
acceptance of WTO jurisdiction is ‘conditional upon the WTO’s being “fair” to 
US interests. And all who follow international trade policy know that the word 
“fair” in this context means serving and defending US economic interests’ 
(Gowan 2004: 477).12 Washington thus reserves the right to reject the very 
free-trade regimes prevailing within the global economy if these regimes 
threaten key economic interests. This forms of rules-based rejectionism runs 
counter to the transnationalized theories examined above.  
 
If we extend this argument to US military capacity, it is inaccurate to view 
the US military apparatus primarily as ‘the ministry of war in the cabinet of 
                                                 
11 Katz, C (2002) ‘Free Trade Area of the Americas. NAFTA Marches South, NACLA: Report on the 
Americas, 4, February, pp.27-31. 
12 Gowan, P.  (2004) ‘Contemporary Intra-Core Relations and World Systems Theory’, Journal of 
World System Research, X: 2, http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol10/number2/pdf/jwsr-v10n2gs-
gowan.pdf, p. 447. 
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an increasingly globally integrated ruling class’. Instead, continued US global 
military hegemony, whereby it is the dominant military power within 
capitalist globalization (for example, see Barack Obama’s quote below), helps 
to determine the nature and structures of contemporary globalization, 
including the interactions between different capitals, so as to reinforce US 
primacy vis-à-vis potential rivals. If we take US intervention in the Middle 
East for example, given the often fragile social basis of a number of the 
regimes in the region, US power insulates them from both external and 
internal forms of opposition that further entrenches the importance of US 
strategic primacy for the prevailing global oil order. Thus, not only have core 
powers come to rely on US strategic primacy to police the internal conditions 
necessary to maintain conditions conducive for capitalist social relations, and 
through which their energy needs are met, the American state also gets to 
set the agenda as to what constitutes the ‘threat’ as well as the responses. 
This threat definition-brigading-pacification equation thus places the US at 
the heart of strategic policing for the global economy, consolidates the 
reliance of others on its power projection capacity as well as allowing the 
American state to ‘brigade’ core powers through mediating the relations 
between these threats (be they state threats such as a rising China or anti-
systemic threats such as Al Qaeda type terrorists) and states reliant on US 
primacy. 
 
Importantly, this is not a reversion to the instrumentalist accounts of inter-
imperial rivalry theorists that we examined above, whereby the US state acts 
solely to benefit concrete national capitalist interests. Indeed, such 
theorizations overlook what Nicos Poulantzas called the ‘relative autonomy’ of 
the state. By this, Poulantzas meant that the state enjoys a degree of 
autonomy from the sectoral interests of its capitalist class, as the state’s 
primary function is to reproduce the necessary conditions for the long-term 
functioning of a given society. Given the global interests of the American 
state that we have sketched above, the structural requirements of the 
capitalist system as a whole are not necessarily synonymous with the 
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interests of sections of the American capitalist class. The state’s structural 
role is thus one of long-term political management which could well be 
compromised by catering too strongly to the interests of a particular sector of 
capital (for example, oil transnationals). As such, Poulantzas’ theory of the 
relative autonomy of the state serves as a useful corrective to overly 
instrumentalist accounts that denude the state of any political autonomy free 
from the immediate requirements of the economic interests of capital 
(Poulantzas 1978). It also serves as a corrective to analysts that frequently 
paint a straw-man Marxism that is economically reductionist.  
 
We need to internationalize this notion when examining the American state 
and this  ‘relative autonomy’ is especially clear given that it has acted as the 
key hegemonic state within world capitalism throughout the post-war period, 
and as such has served to underwrite and police the liberal international 
order within which it enjoys primacy. In so doing, it has developed specific 
capacities to act for global capitalism as a whole (and not just for American 
capitalism), and has served both national and transnational interests. This 
‘dual logic’ of US foreign policy has seen Washington playing a systems-
maintaining role, which has been widely accepted because the US state has 
not just been pursuing its own interests at the expense of all its rivals 
(Lenin’s IIR) but has also helped maintain the  conditions for the expansion 
of capital as a system (Kautsky’s ultraimperialism). 
 
Marxist IR theory and the presidency of Barack Obama: Highlighting 
continuity in US foreign policy  
 
The election of the US’s first African American president sparked a flurry of 
opinion that a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy was upon us. In 
contrast to George W. Bush’s more bellicose and unilateral approach to 
international relations, Obama spoke about greater global cooperation to 
meet the USA’s challenges and presented his presidential candidacy on a 
peaceful platform underpinned by diplomacy. This included advocating the 
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cessation of US military involvement in Iraq and his willingness to open 
dialogue with Iran to address the country’s nuclear program (Obama 2007). 
  
There has not, however, been a reality of change in US foreign policy since 
Obama took office; on the contrary, there is striking continuity. A case in 
point is the US’ continued military engagement across the globe. While 
Obama has withdrawn the USA’s military from Iraq (excluding troops 
remaining as part of the massive US Embassy in Baghdad), he has 
nonetheless intensified the US’ military campaigns in Afghanistan and, 
importantly, Pakistan, conflating these zones into a single theatre of 
operations (termed ‘Af-Pak’). Another notable development is the US’ 
increased use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, more commonly known as 
drones), most pertinently in Pakistan and Yemen. During Obama’s first year 
in office, US drones killed more people than during the entire presidency of 
George W. Bush. In 2010 alone, there were 111 drone strikes in Pakistan, 
compared to nine strikes between 2004 and 2007 (see Lynch 2012).  
 
Further scrutiny reveals other militaristic aspects of Obama’s presidency. For 
example, despite appearing to take a back-seat, the USA has been at the 
forefront of NATO’s military intervention in Libya, which began in early April 
2011. By May 5, 2011, the USA had committed 8507 military personnel, 153 
aircraft, flown 2000 sorties, expended 228 cruise missiles and dropped 455 
bombs. This involvement was markedly higher than the next active coalition 
force, the UK, which, by May 5, 2011, had committed 1300 personnel, 28 
aircraft, flown 1300 sorties, expended 18 cruise missiles and dropped 140 
bombs.13 Global military involvement thus continues to be a central tenet of 
US foreign policy. As the president correctly stated during his successful 
campaign for a second presidential term: ‘Our military spending has gone up 
                                                 
13 Data available from The Guardian. Online (2011). Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-
country#data 
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every single year that I've been in office’, adding that ‘we spend more on our 
military than the next 10 countries combined’.14  
 
There are other continuities which can be elucidated between the Bush and 
Obama presidencies. For example, despite Obama’s declared desire to close 
down the controversial detention center at Guantánamo Bay, it hitherto 
remains open. And despite earlier indications that diplomacy was central to 
US policy towards Tehran, under Obama’s presidency the US has instead 
successfully implemented a series of tough economic sanctions against Iran. 
In this light, the ‘dovish’ Obama appears distinctly more ‘hawkish’ than his 
credentials had previously suggested. 
 
It is important to understand, however, that these continuities extend 
beyond the Bush-Obama paradigm. For instance, the long tradition in US 
foreign policy of supporting the overthrow of democratically elected, left-wing 
governments – which, as noted above, are often deemed inimical to US 
political and economic interests – is also being upheld by the Obama 
administration. Despite initial comments opposing a military coup in 2009 
which deposed Honduras’ leftist, democratically elected president, Manuel 
Zelaya, Obama has refused to suspend US financial assistance to the 
Honduran military and police. In fact, rather than oppose the coup, Obama 
increased requested military aid to Honduras in 2012.15 With clear historical 
parallels, since the coup Honduras’ security forces have been responsible for 
a surge in human rights violations, directed against opponents of the coup, 
journalists, small farmers and other citizens.  
 
Furthermore, despite the global economic crisis, Obama has not significantly 
recalibrated the US’ neo-liberal economic model. As noted above, this model, 
pushed by the USA both at home and abroad, is the preferred economic 
                                                 
14 Obama, quoted in The Huffington Post (2012). Online. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/military-spending-obama-romney_n_2006266.html 
15 See, for example, The Guardian. Online. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/mar/22/democrats-press-obama-us-complicity-
honduras 
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system of business elites, the main benefactors of neo-liberal economics. 
One explanation for the persistence of neo-liberal economics is that the 
Obama administration and business elites have maintained close and 
influential links. This observation is made clear when one considers how 
Obama has funded his presidential election campaigns. As Ali (2010: 32) 
points out, during the 2008 campaign, Obama not only raised much more 
money than his Republican rival, Senator John McCain, but the majority of 
Obama’s campaign funds were realized through large corporate donations. 
‘The donors’, writes Ali (ibid.), ‘included some of Wall Street’s finest, 
investing in their futures: Goldman Sachs ($994,795), Microsoft ($833,617), 
UBS AG ($543,219), Lehman Brothers, in 2007 ($318,467), JP Morgan Chase 
($695,132). There were also substantial donations from Time-Warner, IBM, 
Morgan Stanley, General Electric, Exxon, Google; three top-drawer law firms 
coughed up $15.8 million’. 
 
In light of the above developments, the hope for a discernible change in US 
foreign policy under Obama’s presidency has thus atrophied, however sincere 
one believes the president’s desire for change to be. Indeed, Obama’s time in 
office aptly illustrates the structural confines of a well-entrenched political 
system, including the ambivalence of public opinion, opposition in the US 
Congress to meaningful change and a powerful and influential system of 
corporate lobbying. The constraints of the international political system 
further compound the restrictions faced by president Obama. The argument 
we conclude with, then, is that the continuity of US foreign policy after the 
election of Barack Obama, a US president widely presumed to be progressive 
in his outlook, has further highlighted the utility of critical IR theories in 
understanding US foreign policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted contending theories of imperialism 
which is the primary concept utilized by Marxism to analyze the global 
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economy and interstate relations. We have attempted to draw out the salient 
points in relation to US foreign policy. Throughout the post-war order and up 
to the present day there are of course numerous debates among US foreign 
policy elites as to the precise strategies that should be pursued. However, 
there seems to be very little divergence over the objectives of US foreign 
policy: the continuation of American political, military and economic 
hegemony which has (so far) been fairly beneficial to all core capitalist 
states. We are thus at a strange place in the world, whereby we have a dual 
logic at work in US foreign policy: on the one hand, it must manage its own 
national interests while correlating these with the interests of its subordinate, 
but nonetheless potential rivals. This in turn places the US in a bind in many 
ways. As new security threats emerge and economic competition intensifies 
so does the temptation to use its primacy to pursue a more narrow or 
unilateral order. This in turn threatens the very order that the US was 
instrumental in creating and that has served its own interests well. However, 
if it chooses to work within the rules-based order there is the ever present 
threat that others may attempt to constrain American power, or what Kagan 
has termed a Gulliver complex whereby the sleeping giant is constrained by a 
thousand multilateral strings (Kagan 2003).  
 
At present, many analysts are analyzing the US as an Empire in decline and 
it does seem that the quagmire in Iraq, whereby a ragtag insurgency 
effectively blunted the multi-billion dollar US military machine, and the 
ongoing problems in the Anglo-Saxon hyper-liberal financial markets do point 
to the decline of American power. Is the US in decline? Many critical theorists 
celebrate a potential hegemonic transition to China. Whether this is in fact 
desirable is outside the purview of this chapter. However, if US decline is 
inevitable, what would a post-American world look like: what comes after 
America?   
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